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Making sense of top-down causation: 
 
Universality and functional equivalence in physics and biology 
 





Top-down causation is often taken to be a metaphysically suspicious type of causation that is found 
in a few complex systems, such as in human mind-body relations. However, as Ellis and others 
have shown, top-down causation is ubiquitous in physics as well as in biology. Top-down causation 
occurs whenever specific dynamic behaviors are realized or selected among a broader set of 
possible lower-level states. Thus understood, the occurrence of dynamic and structural patterns in 
physical and biological systems presents a problem for reductionist positions. We illustrate with 
examples of universality (a term primarily used in physics) and functional equivalence classes (a 
term primarily used in engineering and biology) how higher-level behaviors can be multiple 
realized by distinct lower-level systems or states. Multiple realizability in both contexts entails what 
Ellis calls “causal slack” between levels, or what others understand as relative explanatory 
autonomy. To clarify these notions further, we examine procedures for upscaling in multi-scale 
modeling. We argue that simple averaging strategies for upscaling only work for simplistic 
homogenous systems (such as an ideal gas), because of the scale-dependency of characteristic 
behaviors in multi-scale systems. We suggest that this interpretation has implications for what Ellis 
calls mechanical top-down causation, as it presents a stronger challenge to reductionism than 
typically assumed.  
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The problem of top-down causation refers to how and whether changes of higher-level variables 
can have causal effects on lower-level behaviors (Campbell 1974; Ellis 2005; 2008). Top-down 
causation remains a contested issue in science and philosophy of science alike (Auletta, Ellis and 
Jaeger 2008). A common assumption is that if macroscale systems consist of “no more than” 
physical-chemical components, it should be possible to describe higher-level phenomena bottom-up 
from more fundamental lower-level descriptions (e.g., Oppenheim and Putnam 1958; Crick and 
Clark 1994; Bedau 1997). This chapter comments on and adds to important insights from George 
Ellis’ work that challenge this assumption. Ellis has been one of the key figures emphasizing that 
topics such as reductionism and top-down causation are not only philosophically interesting but 
have important practical implications for science and medicine. We examine further examples in 
support of this view, by stressing an even stronger interpretation of what Ellis (2012) calls 
mechanical top-down causation.  
 An important precondition for the existence of top-down causation is that explanations of 
phenomena at higher scales or levels are (relatively) autonomous of explanations at lower levels. If 
higher-level explanations and parameters were fully reducible to or derivable from more 
“fundamental” ones, appeals to top-down causation would be unnecessary or even misleading. In 
arguing against bottom-up determination of higher-level properties, Ellis (2008, 2012) appeals to 
the existence of multiple realizability, illustrated through the existence of equivalence classes in 
different scientific domains. In the following, we therefore examine the connections between 
multiple realizability, equivalence classes, and top-down causation.  
 Multiple realizability means that a higher-level state or property is realized by different 
heterogenous states or properties at a lower level. The term is often introduced in discussions about 
the ontological or explanatory autonomy of higher-level phenomena and models. For instance, 
Putnam argues against physical reduction of mental states by highlighting that mental kinds are 
multiple realized by distinct physical kinds (Putnam 1980). Others have appealed to multiple 
realizability in discussions about explanatory unification (Fodor 1974; Sober 1999; see also 
Brigandt and Love 2017). However, for the purpose of the discussion of top-down causation, the 
most important aspect of multiple realizability is that it supports the explanatory autonomy of more 
general higher-level models that capture similarity in behaviors of heterogenous systems (see also 
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Batterman 2000; 2018). Ellis connects the issues of multiple realizability and top-down causation as 
follows:  
 
Top-down causation takes place owing to the crucial role of context in determining the 
outcomes of lower level causation. Higher levels of organization constrain and channel 
lower level interactions, paradoxically thereby increasing higher level possibilities. A key 
feature here is multiple realizability of higher level functions, and consequent existence of 
equivalence classes of lower level variables as far as higher level actions are concerned. An 
equivalence class identifies all lower level states that correspond to the same higher level 
state. (Ellis 2012, p. 128, emphasis added) 
 
We unpack with further examples the claims that i) multiple realizability supports explanatory 
autonomy of higher-level features, and ii) top-down causation can be interpreted as the effects of 
higher-level constraining relations that determine outcomes of lower-level causation.  
Equivalence classes are also sometimes called universality classes in physics. Both concepts 
highlight how systems with distinct microstructures often display general or universal patterns of 
behavior. Describing these behaviors does not require reference to microscale details – in fact, 
generic models and explanations are often identified through procedures that abstract from or 
selectively leave out irrelevant details (Batterman 2000; Green and Jones 2016). We illustrate the 
relation between multiple realizability and universality through the example of thermodynamics 
near critical points in Section 2.1. We then examine what Ellis terms functional equivalence classes 
in biology, exemplified through feedback control (Section 2.2). Functional equivalence can be 
interpreted as an instance of universality that applies only to engineered and living systems, since 
equivalent behaviors here are characterized in functional terms such as information, robustness, 
homeostasis, control, etc. (Ellis 2008; 2012). Functional equivalence classes typically are more 
context-dependent than classical examples of universality in physics, a point we shall elaborate on 
further below.  
For multiple realizability (or conditional independence) to be possible, Ellis holds, there 
must be causal slack between lower and higher levels (Ellis 2012). The notion of causal slack 
usefully highlights how the explanatory autonomy of higher levels is justified by empirical 
demonstrations of conditional independence of upper-level behavior on many lower-level details 
(see also Woodward, forthcoming and this volume). The term implies that the autonomy is relative 
to certain conditions that hold for a given equivalence class. Just like a sail can be slack within 
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certain length limits of the sheets, so do relations of conditional independence hold within certain 
boundaries or parameter spaces. Hence, the autonomy of macro-level explanations is not absolute, 
but relative (see also Batterman 2018). Critics may argue that this threatens the explanatory 
autonomy of higher-level explanations, and hence the possibility of top-down causation. Instead, we 
believe that the notion of relative autonomy avoids many problems afflicting strong accounts of 
top-down causation (such as difficulties in understanding how different levels are connected), and 
therefore also offers a better description of how scientists develop multi-scale models in practice.   
The emphasis on relative explanatory autonomy parallels Ellis’ distinction between his 
account of top-down causation and a “stronger” interpretation in which top-down causation is 
described as efficient causation operating across levels. A strong account has been criticized for 
giving rise to the problem of causal overdetermination or to mysterious cause-effect relations, 
which would violate the lower-level laws of physics (Kim 1998; 2000). However, if we interpret 
top-down effects as higher-level constraining-relations on the possible lower-level states of a given 
system, top-down causation becomes a matter of understanding how higher levels define the 
boundary conditions of lower-level dynamics (see e.g., Ellis 2008; 2012; 2016; Green 2018; 
Moreno and Mossio 2015; Mossio and Moreno 2010). Constraints are here understood as physical 
conditions that limit the degree of freedom of a dynamic process, thus enabling only selected 
system states (Christiansen 2000; Hooker 2013; Juarrero 1998; 1999). Constraints are typically 
regarded as being at a higher spatial scale than the entities and operations of the constrained 
processes. In biology, constraints are often further defined according to functional levels in a 
hierarchically organized system (Pattee 1971; 1973; Salthe 1985; Wimsatt 2007). For instance, the 
shape and size of blood vessels enable efficient circulation by limiting the degrees of freedom of 
liquid motion, or blood flow. The interpretation of top-down causation as the ability of upper-level 
variables to set the context for lower-level ones may be seen as a “weaker” form of top-down 
causation (Emmeche et al. 2000). Yet, it allows for an understanding of how constraints 
productively can channel system states that are not possible to reach for an unconstrained system.   
The productive aspect of constraints can be illustrated by how an open respiratory system 
would not be able to provide sufficient gas exchange for a large organism. Similarly, the constraints 
provided by a sail on wind flow enable a sailboat to move. When one increases the drag by 
trimming the sail, one does not (effectively) change the operating cause (the wind). Rather, one 
modifies the structural constraints that channel a pressure difference across the windward and 
leeward side of the sail. Constraints thus have causal power by delimiting the space of possibilities 
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for lower-level causes. Without appeals to top-down constraints, we would not be able to explain 
why specific states are realized among multiple possible lower-level states and through such 
selections give rise to emergent properties.  
Ellis distinguishes between several types of top-down causation. The most basic form of 
top-down causation is mechanical top-down causation, exemplified by how the rigid boundaries of 
a gas container constrains the degree of freedom of the lower-scale movement of gas molecules (see 
also Christiansen 2000). Elsewhere, Ellis also refers to this form as algorithmic top-down causation, 
because top-down causation can be understood mathematically as the effects of boundary 
conditions on the solution to equations describing lower-level dynamics (Ellis 2012). A similar 
account is defended by the systems biologist Denis Noble in the context of multi-scale cardiac 
modeling (Noble 2012; 2017; see also Emmeche et al. 2000; Green 2018).  
Whereas physical or chemical systems can exhibit mechanical or algorithmic top-down 
causation, living systems display multiple additional types such as non-adaptive information 
control, adaptive selection, and intelligent top-down causation (Ellis 2008; 2012). These are often 
considered as stronger forms of top-down causation, because biological functions must be 
understood through goals of whole organisms and species, which again depends on higher-level 
features such as the environmental and evolutionary background (Ellis and Kopel 2017). These 
“stronger” types of top-down causation specific to biological systems are not the focus of our 
chapter.3 Rather, our aim is to show that the ideal of “bottom-up reductionism” (Gross and Green 
2017) can also be challenged with examples of mechanical top-down causation. Our chapter 
responds to a common view or concern that in the contexts of physics and chemistry, “it is not 
always clear whether traditional reductionist point of view is actually overcome, since these [high-
level variables] can again be understood as a complicated effect of more elementary processes” 
(Auletta, Ellis and Jaeger 2008, p. 1162). We draw on examples from both physics and biology to 
argue that higher-level variables used to model many multi-scale systems are, in fact, not reducible 
in the sense often assumed. Hence, we think that mechanical top-down causation presents a stronger 
challenge to reductionism than typically assumed.  
 The analysis is structured as follows. After clarifying the concept of universality in physics 
and relating it to Ellis’ notion of equivalence class, we further elaborate on Ellis’ suggestion that 
 
3 Readers interested in these types of downward causation, as well as debates on the metaphysical implications of 
downward causation, may find Paoletti and Orilia’s (2017) comprehensive anthology on downward causation 
interesting. For examples of downward causation in ecology, see also (Allen and Star 1982; Ulanowicz 1986; 1997). 
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feedback control and network motifs are examples of functional equivalence classes (Section 2). 
We then compare top-down causation based on information control to mechanical or algorithmic 
top-down causation (Section 3). Drawing on examples of multi-scale modeling in physics and 
biology, we argue that high level variables used to describe heterogeneous systems cannot be 
derived from micro-scale details through coarse-graining. We end the chapter with reflections on 
the practical implications of the autonomy of scales and top-down causation for science and 
medicine (Sections 4 and 5). 
 
 
2. Universality and functional equivalence  
 
One way to expresses the challenge to the reductionist is to ask: “how can systems that are 
heterogenous at the microscale exhibit the same pattern of behavior at the macro-scale?” 
(Batterman 2018, p. 861). We can answer this question by demonstrating that details of the 
heterogenous realizers are to a large extent explanatorily irrelevant, and thus that we are justified in 
idealizing (and thereby effacing) many lower-scale details when our explanatory target is at higher 
scales. Similarly, Ellis highlights that if an upper-level behavior is multiply realized, we do not have 
to appeal to micro-level details but can explain higher-level patterns through the generic 
characteristics of the equivalence class. For Ellis, the features explaining the characteristics of 
equivalence classes are higher-level constraining relations that channel similar outputs in 
heterogenous systems. Such effects can be interpreted as instances of top-down causation (Ellis 
2012; Section 3).  
 
2.1. Universality and multiply realizability in physics  
 
A paradigmatic example of universality is found in thermodynamic behavior near critical points. 
Various fluids consisting of different chemical elements will have different critical temperatures 
and pressures. That is to say, they will undergo so-called continuous phase transitions at pressures 
and temperatures that depend upon the micro details of the molecules. However, the behavior of 
many different fluids at the critical point of phase transitions are identical and can be characterized 
by the same critical exponents. During a phase transition, e.g., when water boils in a pot, the 
densities of the liquid water and the vapor (steam) will differ. And, in fact, there will be regions of 
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liquid and regions of vapor that coexist in the pot. If one plots the difference in the densities of the 
liquid and the vapor one notices that as the temperature approaches a critical value, this difference 
exhibits power law scaling behavior.  Remarkably, when one plots this behavior for a certain class 




), one can show that they all exhibit the same 
scaling behavior. See Figure 1 for a dramatic display of this behavior. Thus, there is a universal 
property (shared behavior at macroscales by systems distinct at microscales) for systems near their 
respective critical points. More remarkable still is the fact that systems like magnets near criticality 
also display very similar coexistence curves. (For magnets the order parameter is the net 
magnetization4 but the scaling exponent is identical.) Part of the reason for this universal behavior 
is the fact, noted explicitly by Kadanoff (1971) that the closer the system is to criticality, the less 























Figure 1. Vapor-liquid coexistence curve for various fluids. The figure shows the difference in densities at temperatures 




) = (1,1) liquid phase (left) and vapor phase (right) have the same density, thus their 
 
4 The net magnetization can also be understood as a difference in densities. The densities of up-
spins vs. down-spins. This difference vanishes at the critical temperature, as the high temperature 
randomizes the directions of the spins. 
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difference vanishes. Reprinted from Guggenheim, Edward A. 1945. "The principle of corresponding states." The 
Journal of Chemical Physics 13, 7, 253-261, with the permission of AIP Publishing 
 
 If we wish to understand why many different systems exhibit such similar behaviors, we are 
unlikely to find the answer in reductionist appeals to fundamental force laws for each chemical 
component. Rather, the answer is given by the so-called renormalization group explanation of the 
universality of critical phenomena (henceforth RG explanation). This explanation takes advantage 
of the fact that near criticality systems exhibit self-similar, fractal like, behavior. Thus, one can 
introduce a transformation on the space of Hamiltonians that throws away details via a kind of 
coarse-graining. Repeated application of this transformation eliminates details that genuinely 
distinguish the different systems from one another. The hope is to find a fixed point of the 
transformation from which one can determine the value for the scaling exponent. All systems that 
evolve under this transformation to the fixed point for the universality class of systems exhibit the 
same macroscopic scaling behavior. The RG explanation thus extracts structural features that 
stabilize macroscopic phenomena irrespective of changes in or perturbations of microscopic details. 
This example from physics not only gives a concrete interpretation of multiple realizability, but also 
allows for a better understanding of why some very simple models (Ising models, for example) can 
be used in quite varied contexts to help explain the behaviors of real systems (fluids and magnets) 
(Batterman 2000; 2018).  
 Phase transitions illustrate the emergence of new macroscopic features through the different 
characteristics of liquid water, steam, and crystalline ice. They involve discontinuous alterations in 
higher-level behaviors through the influences of higher-level variables (such as temperature and 
pressure) on lower-level interactions (Ellis 2016, 139). In Ellis’ view, environmental variables 
triggering phase transitions should be interpreted as coarse-grained higher-level variables, because 
temperature and pressure cannot be attributed to isolated molecules. Like order parameters, these 
point to collective properties arising in a constrained system, such as a gas container (see also 
Christiansen 2000). Yet, pressure and temperature are interpreted as coarse-grained because they 
can be identified through averaging of lower-level details (see Section 3). Accordingly, phase 
transitions of this type represent the most basic (or weak) form of top-down causation (Ellis 2016, 
pp. 224-225). We shall return to this point in Section 3, after examining some examples from 
biology for comparison. 
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2.2. Functional equivalence and information control in biology 
 
Ellis uses the term functional equivalence class when referring to models in the life sciences that 
identify correspondence (or equivalence) of lower-level states or systems with respect to the 
corresponding higher-level variables and behavior (Ellis 2008; 2012). Examples of these are 
recurring network motifs and feedback control, which exemplify multiple realizability in biology. 
We further unpack examples from systems biology that support this view.  
 A hallmark of living systems is homeostasis, i.e., the ability of organisms to maintain a 
relatively stable internal environment despite external perturbations (Bernard 1927/1957; Cannon 
1929). The robustness of functional steady states in organisms is typically explained with reference 
to feedback control, a concept imported to biology from engineering in the 1920s and later 
formalized by the mathematician Norbert Wiener (Wiener 1948). Wiener’s book was ground-
breaking in suggesting that the same mathematical models can be used to describe feedback control 
in very different oscillatory systems, from electrical circuits to metabolic regulation in different 
organisms. The hope for generic systems principles was highlighted also in Rachevsky’s 
mathematical biology and Bertalanffy’s general system theory (Green and Wolkenhauer 2013). In 
recent years, systems biology has further strengthened and elaborated on this view by using generic 
models from control theory and graph theory to describe so-called organizing or design principles 
in living systems (Alon 2007; Green 2015).  
An example of a design principle is integral feedback control, which is used to explain 
robust perfect adaptation in bacterial chemotaxis. The example is described in further detail in other 
publications (Green and Jones 2016; Serban and Green, 2020), and we shall here focus only on why 
integral feedback control can be seen as an instance of multiple realizability. An important question 
in biology is how various functions are maintained despite environmental perturbations. For 
instance, biologists are interested in understanding how motile bacteria can detect changes in the 
concentrations of nutrients or toxins in their environment and optimize their movements according 
to these. Remarkably, chemotactic bacteria have receptor systems that can detect and respond to 
concentration changes in their environments with the same precision before and after stimulus. In 
engineering terms, the receptor system is said to display robust perfect adaptation (RPA), i.e., the 
system will return to its pre-stimulus value and regain sensitivity over a large range of parameter 
values (Alon et al. 1999). Achieving this kind of robustness is a hard problem in engineering. 
Engineers are often interested in designing systems that asymptotically track a fixed steady-state 
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value, so as to maintain system function despite noisy input signals (or changes in initial 
conditions).  
 In engineering, robust adaptation to pre-stimulus steady-state values can be achieved 
through a design principle called integral feedback control (IFC). IFC refers to a quantifiable 
feedback relation in which the difference between the desired output (steady-state activity) and the 
actual output is fed back to the system as the integral of the system error. Strikingly, the 
mathematical description of bacterial receptor systems has been found to be equivalent to formal 
models of integral feedback control in engineering. Systems biologist John Doyle and colleagues 
derived the principle through a mathematical analysis in which they reduced a mechanistically 
detailed model of the receptor system to a generic description involving only relations sufficient for 
the higher-level property of robust perfect adaptation (Yi et al. 2000).5 As a result, IFC was 
proposed as a design principle that generically constrains functional behaviors and enables robust 
perfect adaptation, regardless of the causal details of the heterogenous systems realizing this 
capacity. In Ellis’ terms, we can say that there is sufficient “causal slack” between higher-level 
behaviors and lower-level realizers to allow for the same principle to apply to systems as different 
as bacteria and engineered thermostats. We shall comment further on this example below.  
Similar examples of multiple realizability in biology are so-called network motifs in gene 
regulatory networks (Ellis 2012; Fang 2020). Network motifs are small sub-circuits of regulatory 
connections that have been found to be frequent in biological regulatory networks and have been 
hypothesized to display characteristic generic functions (Alon 2007).6 For instance, a so-called 
coherent feedforward loop, cFFL, has been shown to implement a sign-sensitive delay of outputs in 
response to input signals. This function was first demonstrated mathematically through a simple 
Boolean input function (see Figure 2), and the hypothesized function was subsequently confirmed 
experimentally in living bacteria (Mangan et al. 2003). In biological systems, it can function as a 
persistence detector that can filter out noisy input signals, such as brief fluctuations in the 
concentration of nutrients available in a bacteria’s environment. This ensures that protein synthesis 
of metabolizing enzymes is only activated when the activating signal (availability of sugars) is 
persistent (for further details, see Alon 2007).  
 
5 This aspect is analyzed in further detail in (Green and Jones 2016). 
6 Investigations of the stabilizing aspects of global constraints in networks have been explored much earlier, e.g., by 
Stuart Kauffman’s demonstrations of how the structure of Boolean networks constrains the possible network states 
(Kauffman 1969; 1993).  
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Figure 2. The design principle of the coherent FFL describes how the rate of a protein, Z, is a function of the activity of 
two transcription factors, X and Y, which are activated by two independent signal inputs (Sx and Sy). Detection of signal 
persistence arises as a result of the time difference between direct and indirect activation routes (X to Y, and X to Z via 
Y), and the requirement for persistent stimuli from both X and Sy before Y is activated (compare graphs for activation 
of X, Y, and Z). Hence, short pulses do not lead to activation of Z, but persistent activation of X and Y will. Reprinted 
by permission from Macmillan Publishers Ltd: Shen-Orr et al. Network motifs in the transcriptional regulation network 
of Escherichia coli, Nature Genetics, 31, 64-68, Copyright (2002). 
  
 Systems biologists more generally use the term design principles to highlight that generic network 
structures instantiate general dynamic patterns that i) are independent of specific realizations in 
different causal systems, and ii) serve functional or goal-oriented roles in engineering and biology 
(Green 2015). In other words, the characteristics of functional equivalence classes are explained 
with reference to how network structures constrain dynamic outputs to enable generic types of 
functions such as sustained oscillations, noise filtering, robust perfect adaptation, signal 
amplification, bi-stable switching, etc. (Doyle and Stelling 2006; Tyson et al. 2003; Tyson and 
Novák 2010). 
The quest for design principles highlights the hope in systems biology that any network 
circuit with a specific structure, regardless of the specific details of its causal constituents, will 
belong to a more general functional equivalence class. If so, this would allow gene regulatory 
functions to be predicted and explained independently of detailed knowledge about the lower-level 
genetic and molecular details of specific systems. Generic functions of network motifs have been 
demonstrated in various contexts (Alon 2007). In the neighboring field of synthetic biology, 
multiple realizability through network motifs is exploited as a design heuristic for the synthesis of 
synthetic circuits with pre-defined functions (Koskinen 2017; 2019). Similarly, systems biologists 
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have recently explored the global properties of gene regulatory networks, following up on 
Kauffman’s (1969; 1993) insight that even complex networks often converge to a limited set of 
stable states. Using the framework of dynamical systems theory, systems biologists have 
demonstrated that many different molecular mechanisms can lead to the same attractor states 
(representing biological functions or states of cell differentiation), thus moving the focus from the 
details of causal pathways to system trajectories (Huang 2011). This approach can potentially 
explain biological robustness (via top-down causation), because it can show how stable functional 
states are largely independent of the specific states (or initial conditions) of specific network nodes.  
Functional equivalence classes in biology are, however, more contested than the classical 
examples of universality in physics (Auletta, Ellis and Jaeger 2008). Analyses of global network 
topologies and network motifs have shown that functions of genetic circuits are dependent on the 
contexts of the gene regulatory network, the environment, and organisms as a whole (Huang 2011; 
DiFrisco and Jaeger 2019). It has therefore been debated to what extent the structure of network 
motifs determines gene regulatory functions (Isalan et al. 2008; Jiménez et al. 2017). Similarly, 
systems biologists have debated whether biological systems exhibiting robust perfect adaptation 
necessarily realize integral feedback control (cf., Yi et al. 2000; Briat et al. 2014). Importantly, 
however, conditional independence is compatible with some degree of context-dependence within 
defined boundaries. We further clarify this below. 
The discovered complexity has sparked an interest in understanding how wider system 
contexts can influence the characteristic functioning of specific network motifs. This can for 
instance be done through simulations where parameter spaces for the strengths of inputs and 
weighting of regulatory connections are varied (Tyson and Novák 2010). Hence, an aim here is to 
explore the conditions under which generic functions can be inferred from structural network 
types. Systems biologists have also used computer simulations to explore the possibility spaces for 
network structures that can realize specific functions of interest. For instance, they explore how 
many network topologies fall within a functional equivalence class and which structural features 
characterize the class. As an example, Ma et al. (2009) conducted a computational search for 
networks capable of performing robust perfect adaptation and investigated their regulatory wiring 
patterns. From a starting point of 16,038 possible network topologies, they found that only 395 
were capable of performing RPA, and that they all fell into two generic structural classes (one is a 
negative feedback loop with a buffer node, the other is an incoherent feedforward loop). 
Interestingly, all known biological examples of RPA are instantiations of the negative feedback 
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control type, as described by Yi et al. (2000). The example thus highlights how structural 
constraints may realize functions that are multiply realized in distinct systems and thus “unify the 
organization of diverse circuits across all organisms” (Ma et al. 2009, 760).7  
 The complexity and diversity of biological systems presents a major challenge to provide an 
analysis in this context similar to the RG explanation in physics. But despite the limitations for 
universal laws in biology, generic models have proven useful for explaining why characteristic 
dynamic patterns arise in causally different systems. An ideal in systems biology is to shift the 
focus from inherent properties of specific genes or proteins to how those are interconnected through 
stabilizing regulatory structures that give rise to similar higher-level behaviors. In physics and 
chemistry as well as biology, an important part of scientific analysis is thus to determine “how 
many values of hidden variables can underlie the same higher-level description” (Ellis 2016, p. 
120). In the following, we examine further how the causal slack of “hidden variables” supports a 
relative explanatory autonomy of higher-level models.  
 
2.3. Causal slack and explanatory autonomy 
 
The notion of hidden variables can be understood as a domain of lower-level causal details 
that would not change the output of a higher-level function, e.g., because the system trajectory 
would converge to the same fixed point or attractor in an abstract phase space.8 As Ellis highlights, 
for a given equivalence class “it does not matter which particular lower level state occurs, as long as 
the corresponding higher-level variables are in the desired range” (Ellis 2008, p. 74). This has 
important implications for the way natural phenomena are represented and explained.  
A notable feature of systems biology textbooks, compared to those of molecular biology, is 
that molecular details are almost absent in the figures and diagrams (cf., Alon 2007; Lodish et al. 
2008). The use of highly abstract illustrations not only highlights how the functional descriptions 
are (relatively) independent of molecular details, but also that functional equivalence classes are 
identified through procedures of what Ellis (2012) calls information hiding. Akin to how we arrive 
at explanations for universal behaviors in physics by the use of RG explanations, systems biologists 
 
7 This necessarily involves abstraction from lower-level details. In the words of Ma et al.: “Here, instead of focusing on 
one specific signaling system that shows adaptation, we ask a more general question: what are all network topologies 
that are capable of robust adaptation?” They further state that the aim to “construct a unified function-topology mapping 
[…] may otherwise be obscured by the details of any specific pathway and organism”. (Ma et al. 2009) 
 
8 It goes (almost) without saying that this notion of “hidden variables” is not quantum mechanical. 
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must necessarily abstract from molecular details in order to make the generic patterns of network 
organization visible (Levy and Bechtel 2013; Green 2015).  
Some would argue that information hiding strips the abstract network models of their 
explanatory power, and that these are explanatory only in so far as details are added back to explain 
the workings of specific systems. For instance, Matthiessen (2016) argues that design principles 
such as IFC are not explanatory if they do not allow us to distinguish between different species of 
bacteria or between organisms and thermostats. But while fine-graining by adding details would 
serve the explanatory purpose of how specific systems work (what we can call a type-I question), it 
would not address the (type-II) question of what these systems have in common or why the same 
abstract model or principle applies to causally diverse systems (Batterman 2002, p. 23). The 
reductionist would hence have to explain how higher-level descriptions can be relatively 
autonomous from changes of lower-scale details (see also Wimsatt 2007).  
To respond to the type-II question, it is important to highlight two implications of what Ellis 
calls causal slack, and others understand through scale separation of multi-level systems. Scale 
separation refers to the manifestation of different dominant behaviors at different length scales, 
which accordingly must be described through different types of mathematical models (Batterman 
2012). If, for instance, one is interested in modeling the bending properties of a material such as 
steel, it would not be useful for take the lowest (atomic) scale as the starting point. Instead, one 
typically starts with variables at the mesoscale and upscales to higher-level variables (such as 
elastic material parameters) that are used in continuum models. In fact, a detailed microscale 
models would often be irrelevant if the aim is to describe upper-scale continuum behaviors, as 
upper-level behaviors are literally invisible at the lowest scales. Scale separation explains why 
meso- and macroscale models often work well, despite ignoring or even misrepresenting many 
lower-level details. Indeed, mesoscale parameters are often dependent on some microscopic details, 
and these are accounted for through so-called homogenization strategies (see also Section 3). One 
can interpret the use of such strategies as a way to determine the degree and kind of causal slack 
between different spatial scales.  
 Top-down causation implies that higher-level features are not just relatively autonomous 
from lower-level description but also influence the latter through constraining relations. An 
objection to this view may be that since higher-level features primarily select among possible 
lower-level states, higher levels are not really autonomous after all. If lower levels define the 
possibilities, and if emergent features are always realized through materials at lower levels, what 
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does autonomy really consist in?9 Our response is as follows. First, causal slack implies that higher 
levels are not fully controlled or determined by lower-level features but also by the structuring of 
the system. Second, the requirement of higher-level boundary conditions to constrain the space of 
causal possibilities implies that some lower-level states cannot be accounted for without the 
boundary conditions imposed by higher-level structures. For instance, Noble (2012) highlights how 
a phenomenon such as the heart rhythm is not possible without top-down causation, because the 
constraining relations of a membrane (understood mathematically as cell voltage) are required to 
produce oscillations of ionic currents.  
Noble’s example illustrates how constraints, as indicated in the introduction, must be 
understood in an enabling as well as limiting sense, as they allow for stable system behaviors or 
robust functions that would be impossible to reach in an unconstrained system (Pattee 1971; 1973). 
Another example illustrating this point is how our rigid skeleton enables upright movement on land 
by delimiting the possible directions of muscle contraction (Hooker 2013). It would be misleading 
to say, in this context, that the top-down constraints of the bone primarily provide a (non-
explanatory) background for the lower-level states or operations of molecular muscle cells. Rather, 
as in the case of cardiac cells, certain emergent properties become possible only when constraining 
relations are applied on lower-level states. The causal power of top-down constraints can also be 
clarified through “negative” examples, where the constraints are removed and functions as a result 
become impossible to obtain. Breaking a bone has immediate effects on the causal possibilities for 
muscle performance, just like a ripped sail immediately changes the speed and control of a sailboat. 
Similarly, Noble mathematically demonstrates how removal of the top-down constraints of cell 
voltage causes oscillations to cease in a simulation of the heart rhythm (Noble 2012). Generally, 
many biological processes would not be possible without inter-level constraining relations (see 






9 This concern was for instance raised after a talk by Ellis entitled “On the Nature of Causality in Complex Systems”, at 
the conference The Causal Universe, Krakow, Poland, May 17-18, 2012. Available online: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nEhTkF3eG8Q. In the following we further elaborate on a possible response to this 
question.  
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3. Top-down causation and high-level variables 
 
For Ellis, a crucial feature of top-down causation is how coherent higher-level actions emerge from 
top-down constraints on lower-level dynamics (Ellis 2012, p. 128). Such constraints are often 
mathematically described as boundary conditions that delimit the set of lower-level variables (e.g., 
the set of initial conditions as inputs to the dynamics) within which a given function can be realized. 
Top-down causation should thus not be understood as causal effects that are completely 
autonomous from lower-level dynamics. The organizing or design principles defined at higher 
scales nevertheless have causal effects that constrain the distributions or values of lower-level 
constituents or states, thus enabling emergent behaviors of lower levels (cf. Emmeche et al. 2000). 
As mentioned in the introduction, Ellis (2008; 2012) distinguishes between several types of 
downward causation. Following up on sections 2.1. and 2.2, we focus only on two, namely top-
down causation by information control and mechanical or algorithmic top-down causation.  
 Feedback control loops in biology are instances of what Ellis calls top-down causation by 
information control (Auletta, Ellis and Jaeger 2008; Ellis 2012). The IFC-principles and the 
proposed generic functions of network motifs highlight a basic condition for equivalence classes, 
namely that many different input situations or causal “realizers” would give rise to equivalent 
operational outcomes, as long as basic structural requirements are obeyed. Importantly, a feedback 
loop is here interpreted as a structural constraint that delimits the space of possibilities for lower-
level dynamics. Hence, feedback control consists in information selection. For instance, the 
structure of a feedforward loop motif determines whether a genetic circuit should respond only to 
persistent input signals (coherent feedforward loop) or immediately to any nutrient detected 
(incoherent feedforward loop). As illustrated in Figure 2, coherent feedforward loops control 
transcription by introducing a time difference between direct and indirect transcription activation 
routes. Similarly, incoherent feedforward loops can minimize the response to disturbance by 
simultaneously activating the transcription of an output product and an intermediary transcription 
factor that inhibits output protein production. Hence, structures such as network motifs constrain the 
dynamic possibilities of gene regulation at a lower scale in a hierarchy (see also Bechtel 2017). Ellis 
defines top-down causation by information control as follows: 
 
Top-down causation by information control occurs thanks to the connection between 
equivalence classes and information control […] In this case, the feedback control circuits 
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produce reliable responses to higher level information (Ellis 2006; 2008), allowing 
equivalences classes of lower level operations that give the same higher level response for a 
certain goal. (Auletta, Ellis and Jaeger, pp. 1169-1170).  
   
Different lower-level operations are here considered as controlled by information from above in the 
sense that the control circuits are considered as higher-level entities in two senses. First, the 
functions are implemented by networks that cannot be reduced to the operation of lower-level 
entities in isolation (Ellis 2008). Second, functional goals are higher-level concepts referring to the 
properties of a whole system (an organism, metabolic system, or circuit of interacting processes or 
entities). The second feature requires some clarification. Ellis (2008) argues that: “[t]he goals in 
biological systems are “intrinsic higher-level properties of the system considered, and determine the 
outcome (unlike the usual physical case, where the initial state plus boundary conditions determine 
the outcome). […] The initial state of the system is then irrelevant to its final outcome, provided the 
system parameters are not exceeded” (Ellis 2008, p. 74).  
Ellis stresses that top-down relations in biology include considerations of part-whole 
relations, which do not necessarily translate to the physical context. While we agree with this 
characterization, we do not view downward causation primarily as a compositional relation between 
parts and wholes (see also Woodward, forthcoming). Rather, we view top-down causation as 
relations between higher-level and lower-level variables. Thus understood, we find it potentially 
misleading to consider the relative independence from initial conditions as a prime feature that 
separates physical and biological systems. As we have seen, universality in physics is characterized 
through insensitivity to lower scale details, and both biological and physical systems can be 
described through equivalence classes within certain boundaries of system parameters. 
Accordingly, we suggest, that “bottom-up reductionism” can also be challenged by examples of 
mechanical or algorithmic top-down causation in both physics and biology. Although typically 
considered a “weaker form” of top-down causation, compared to top-down causation by 
information control, cases of multi-scale modeling in both domains highlight the limitations of a 
bottom-up approach (Batterman and Green 2020). Mechanical or algorithmic top-down causation 
refers to a ubiquitous form of top-down causation that occurs whenever “high-level variables have 
causal power over lower level dynamics through system structuring or boundary conditions, so that 
the outcome depends on these higher level variables” (Ellis 2012, p. 128). With Ellis, we believe 
that this form of top-down causation is much more common than typically recognized.  
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3.1. Revisiting mechanical top-down causation 
As mentioned, Ellis views mechanical top-down causation as a phenomenon occurring also in 
physical and chemical systems. This was exemplified in the way changes in higher-level variables 
(such as pressure or temperature) can lead to changes in lower level interactions in gases and fluids, 
enabling new properties such as gas ignition or phase transitions (Section 2.1).10 In these examples, 
Ellis seems to assume the correspondence between lower- and higher-level variables is given by a 
relatively simple relation between these, i.e., that higher-level variables can be derived from coarse-
graining of lower-level ones (Auletta, Ellis and Jaeger 2008). Ellis broadly defines high level 
variables as follows:   
 
A high level variable is a quantity that characterizes the state of the system in terms of a 
description using high level concepts and language – it cannot be stated in terms of low 
level variables. Use of such variables involves information hiding, for they are the relevant 
variables for the higher level description, e.g., the pressure, temperature and density of a 
gas, without including unnecessary lower level details (such as molecular positions and 
velocities). (Ellis 2008, p. 70).  
 
Ellis further distinguishes between coarse-grained higher-level variables and irreducible higher-
level variables. The pressure of an ideal gas exemplifies the former, whereas feedback loops or the 
tertiary structure of protein folding illustrate the latter (see also Brigandt and Love 2017). Coarse-
grained variables can be obtained by averaging over a set of lower level variables, and they are 
therefore in principle possible to derive from lower-level details (although this is often not done for 
practical reasons). This has implications for the strength of mechanical top-down causation because 
Ellis views all the high-level variables concerned with this type of top-down causation as coarse-
grained. He further writes: “The resulting high level relations are then an inevitable consequence of 
the low level interaction, given both the high level context and the low level dynamics (based in 
physics)” (Ellis 2008, p. 72).  
As a friendly amendment to this view, we suggest that the scope of mechanical or 
algorithmic top-down causation be expanded to include cases that go beyond instances of simply 
coarse-grained higher-level variables. While we agree that the high level variables are coarse-
 
10 Other examples from physics are discussed in (Bishop 2012; Christiansen 2000; see also Ellis 
2018). 
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grained in the case of homogeneous systems such as ideal gases, there are many multi-scale systems 
in physics where meso- and macroscale parameters cannot be obtained via simple averaging 
procedures (Batterman and Green, 2020). This presents a further challenge to the reductionist point 
of view.   
Indeed, in the case of an ideal gas, we can assume that the system is homogenous, and we 
can therefore upscale to the higher-level thermodynamic behavior by relatively simple averaging 
over micro-scale details (such as molecular spatial and velocity distributions). However, whenever 
multi-scale systems are heterogenous and display more complicated limit behaviors, this approach 
would fail. For instance, if the task is to develop a multi-scale model of the bending behaviors and 
relative strength of heterogenous materials such as a steel beam or vertebrate bone, complex 
homogenizations strategies are typically adopted to account for mesoscale structures that are not 
observable at lower scales (Batterman and Green 2020). In both contexts, simple averaging over 
lower-scale variables would not enable scientists to predict macroscale material properties. 
For multiscale systems that are heterogeneous (e.g., composites of materials with different 
conductivities or elastic behaviors), the aim of upscaling is to find effective (continuum scale) 
parameters (like Young’s modulus) that code for microstructural details of the composites.11 
Typically this involves the examination of a representative volume element (RVE) that reflects the 
nature of heterogeneities at scales (mesoscales) where those structures are deemed to be important.  
One introduces correlation functions to characterize (primarily) the geometric and topological 
aspects of the mixture in the RVE (Torquato 2002). The mathematics that enables one to find the 
effective parameters that characterize the behavior of the composite at the continuum scale is called 
“homogenization theory.” (Batterman and Green 2020 discusses some aspects of this in the context 
of materials science and biology. See also Batterman, forthcoming.) Note that the relative autonomy 
of the homogenized system (at the continuum scale) from the atomic lower scale details reflects a 
kind of emergence. This sense of emergence is weaker than that associated with higher-level 
variables characterizing the human mind or social phenomena. Yet, the higher-level parameters 
cannot be reduced to or derived from lower-level details.  
Consider Young’s modulus, an example of a higher-level parameter of central importance in 
materials science and biophysics. Young’s modulus parameterizes the stiffness of a material and is 
identified as the slope (or coefficient of proportionality) of a stress-strain curve of a given material. 
Stiffness is understood as the resistance of a material to deformation in response to applied force 
 
11 Note that “microstructure” here refers to structures far above the atomic and far below the continuum. 
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and cannot be understood or defined at atomic scales. More generally, material parameters describe 
mechanical properties of a larger continuum of structure that cannot be measured or defined at the 
level of individual “parts”. As stressed by developmental biologist (and biophysicist) Lance 
Davidson and colleagues, material parameters of relevance for modeling of the development of an 
embryo are inherently higher-level concepts:  
 
The capacity of the notochord to resist bending as it extends the embryo comes from the 
structure of the whole notochord. Measurements at the level of the individual collagen fiber 
or fluid-filled cells that make up the structure would not reveal the mechanical properties of 
the whole notochord. (Davidson et al. 2009, p. 2157)  
 
We can interpret this as a form of (mechanical) top-down causation because biomechanical  
features influence the development of vertebrate embryos through constraints on motility and 
bending of cells (Green and Batterman 2017). As in the case of feedback loops, the higher-level 
material parameters cannot be achieved through coarse-graining but requires measurements where 
the whole structure must be intact. Similarly, the action potential in neurons is a mesoscale 
parameter that cannot be measured or understood at the molecular or sub-cellular level because the 
property depends on the whole cell structure (Noble 2012). We should therefore not think of higher-
level variables in this context as merely “smeared-out versions” of a more fundamental lower-level 
description. At the same time, the explanatory autonomy should not be overemphasized as there is 
clearly some connection between microstructure and material parameter values. In both physics and 
biology, modeling of materials over large spatial scales requires that scales are bridged, e.g., via the 
identification of RVEs. In biology, the relations between higher and lower-scale variables are often 
illustrated in diagrams through feedback relations going both up and down (see e.g., Noble 2012; 
Lesne 2013). Thus, the idea of a scale dependent relative autonomy offers an alternative to more 
extreme positions (reductionism or anti-reductionism), while capturing aspects of how scientists 
deal with multi-scale systems.  
In summary, examples of multiscale systems that are heterogenous (unlike ideal gases) 
support a stronger interpretation of the causal role of higher-level variables in the context of 
mechanical top-down causation. Higher-level variables in such contexts are not coarse-grained in 
the weaker sense that they can be derived from lower-level details via simple averaging. Rather, the 
requirement for homogenization strategies in multiscale modeling highlights how higher-level 
variables are relatively autonomous from lower-level descriptions. The examples thus challenge an 
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assumption in the definition of mechanical top-down causation (Ellis 2008; 2012), but in doing so 
they also strengthen Ellis’ point about the importance and ubiquity of top-down causation and 
emergence in science.  
 
4. The practical importance of top-down causation  
 
Debates on the possibility or strength of top-down causation are often assumed to primarily be of 
theoretical interest to philosophers. However, as emphasized by Ellis and others, top-down 
causation and equivalence classes have important practical implications (Auletta, Ellis and Jaeger 
2008; Ellis, Noble and O'Connor 2012; see also Wimsatt 1976; 2007). Top-down causation, for 
Ellis, is not a mysterious metaphysical concept, but an empirical phenomenon that can be 
demonstrated through experimental intervention. He defines the following operational criteria for 
top-down causation:  
 
To characterize some specific causal effect as a top-down effect, we must demonstrate that a 
change of higher level conditions alters the sequence of processes at lower levels; we do this 
by changing higher level conditions and seeing what happens at the lower levels (Ellis 
2012).  
 
Thus, top-down causation is here given a concrete interpretation as a relation between system 
variables at different spatial scales or levels (see also Ellis 2016, p. 16, and Woodward, 
forthcoming). If intervening on macroscale variables can change the dynamic states of microscale 
processes, it has important practical implications for the design of experiments, for multi-scale 
modeling, as well as for discussions about where and how to intervene to control and change future 
outcomes (such as disease definitions and treatment modalities in medicine, for instance). In the 
following, we present further examples of this view.  
 
4.1. Top-down causation and multi-scale modelling 
 
Scientific explanations often highlight molecular activities (biology) or the role of laws and initial 
conditions (physics), but boundary conditions are often equally important for understanding system 
behaviors. In the context of multi-scale cardiac modeling, Noble (2012) argues forcefully that that 
the models describing the processes at the lowest scale, i.e., ordinary differential equations 
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describing ionic currents, cannot be solved without the boundary conditions determined by the cell 
voltage. It is important to note here that cell voltage is a parameter that cannot be defined at the 
molecular or subcellular scale. Similarly, models of the action potential at the level of cells depend 
on inputs from models at the tissue scale (defined via partial differential equations), which describe 
how biophysical features of the tissue can influence the propagation of electrical currents through 
the 3D structure of the heart (Qu et al. 2011; Green 2018).   
Although parameters such as the cell voltage, or the geometrical and electrical properties of 
different tissue types are “nothing but” properties of physical structures, they are not reducible to or 
derivable from lower-scale variables. In fact, one cannot measure or even conceptualize these 
variables at lower scales. They also cannot be reduced to explanatory background conditions for 
descriptions of causal efficacy at lower scales, because the boundary conditions and higher-level 
parameters in general are required to channel the lower-level behaviors in the first place. As 
highlighted by Noble: “without the downward causation from the cell potential, there is no [heart] 
rhythm” (Noble 2012, p. 58). A reductionist perspective thus faces great difficulties in terms of 
showing that a bottom-up analysis is itself sufficient.  
In the context of developmental biology and cancer research, the importance of top-down 
causation is also increasingly acknowledged. New experimental techniques to manipulate higher-
level biomechanical cues have revealed that macroscale biomechanical properties (e.g., tissue 
stiffness) can influence gene expression, molecular signaling pathways, as well as cell 
differentiation (Miller and Davidson 2013). This has important implications for understanding how 
biomechanical constraints can buffer genetic “noise”, and how there is sufficient causal slack 
between macroscale biomechanical models and molecular details to allow modelers to efface many 
lower-scale details. Moreover, it has (negative) implications for the view that genetic or molecular 
causation has a privileged role in developmental biology (this is further discussed in Green and 
Batterman 2017). The biases of such perspectives can also have important social implications, as 
we now clarify.  
 
4.2. Research and treatment modalities in medicine 
 
Ellis (2012) highlights the existence of different treatment modalities in medicine, depending on 
whether one commits to a reductionist (bottom-up) perspective or to a more holistic view. This is 
particularly apparent in the case of mental disorders, where the focus can span from genetic 
susceptibilities and molecular dysfunctions to how states of the mind can impact physical health 
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(see also Ellis 2016). Philosophical assumptions concerning the possibility and relative importance 
of top-down causation (vs. bottom-up causation) does, in fact, influence which research questions 
and treatment regime are seen as most promising. Attention to top-down causation can fruitfully 
point to the missed opportunities of the prioritized focus on reductionist research programs – and 
positively highlight the potential benefits of a broader perspective (Fuchs 2018).  
 In closing, we provide a few examples to illustrate this view. Cancer is often understood as a 
disease caused by accumulation of somatic mutations. However, increasing evidence suggests that 
tissue-scale properties can sometimes overrule genetic instructions (Soto et al. 2008; Bissel and 
Hines 2011). The constraints of the tissue can either promote or reduce cell proliferation and 
motility, depending on the biomechanical properties of the tumor microenvironment, which is 
another important example of top-down causation (Green, forthcoming). Hence, the reductionist 
perspective may create unfortunate blind spots, such as the opportunity to develop treatment 
strategies that target tissue-scale properties (Stylianopoulos 2017).  
Similarly, the criticism of reductionism is highly relevant in the context of preventive medicine. 
With the promotion of precision medicine, the research focus on genetic factors that increase an 
individual’s susceptibility for developing complex diseases like cancer, depression, or dementia has 
intensified. But a focus on genetic factors is neither sufficient for understanding and treating such 
complex diseases, nor is it necessarily more precise. An important concern is that genetic risk 
profiling at the individual level shifts attention away from structural causes at the population level, 
such as socio-economic disparities, that may be more efficient to intervene on (Hoeyer 2019; Olstad 
and McIntyre 2019). Top-down causation is therefore not only of theoretical philosophical interest, 
but it is an empirical phenomenon with profound scientific and social implications.  
 
 
5. Concluding remarks  
 
Explanatory autonomy of levels or scales is often defended with reference to the existence of 
universality or functional equivalence classes. Universal or functionally equivalent behaviors are 
described through macroscale models and parameters that cannot be reduced to lower-level models. 
Examples examined in this chapter include thermodynamics near critical points as well as feedback 
control in biology. The examples illustrate how models can be explanatory without specifying how 
a behavior is causally realized in any specific system. In fact, generic models are explanatory 
because they show how many causal details are explanatorily irrelevant as long as stabilizing 
structures defining an equivalence class are in place. The notion of information hiding highlights 
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that there is enough “causal slack” at the bottom to make the inclusion of all possible lower-level 
details irrelevant or even counterproductive for the purpose of explaining higher level or multiscale 
systems. 
A key issue in discussions of reductionism and top-down causation is whether higher-level 
variables can be derived from lower-level details. Mechanical top-down causation is often seen as a 
weak form of top-down causation, because the high-level variables are taken to be nothing but 
coarse-grained correlates of lower-level variables. Thus understood, it is unclear whether 
reductionism is overcome. We have argued that upscaling of variables via coarse-graining only 
works for simple homogenous systems, such as an ideal gas. For systems with complex 
microstructures at the mesoscale (such as steel or bone), more involved upscaling techniques are 
required. The reason is that physical systems at different scales display distinct physical structures 
and behaviors, and that higher-level behaviors are dependent on some microstructural details that 
are best studied at the mesoscale.  
Mesoscale parameters (such as material parameters) differ from what Ellis calls coarse-
grained high-level variables in being identified via homogenization strategies. The need for such 
strategies signals a stronger explanatory autonomy of high-level variables also in physical examples 
than often assumed. Hence, attention to scale-dependency of characteristic behaviors in multi-scale 
systems offers support to Ellis’ account by further extending the scope and significance of 
mechanical top-down causation. Top-down causation is not a suspicious, rare form of causation, but 
is ubiquitous in physical and biological systems alike. This has important practical implications not 
only for scientific modeling and explanation, but also for how we best approach complex socio-
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